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Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court, by identifying
some sentences as too harsh for youth and banning some forms of
punishment, has narrowed what constitutes an appropriate sentence for
juveniles. The Court distinguished juveniles from adults by requiring a
juvenile's age to be a consideration for particular sentences and prohibiting
the harshest sentences from being imposed on juvenile offenders. In 2005,
it determined that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is
unconstitutional.1  Five years later, the Court found that sentencing
juveniles to life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for non-
homicide crimes also violated the Constitution.2 Most recently, in 2012 the
Court decided discretion is crucial when sentencing juveniles to LWOP and
held that, even in the case of homicide crimes, juveniles cannot be
sentenced to LWOP under a mandatory scheme.3
As a result of these Supreme Court decisions, laws across the country
have started to reflect the differences between juveniles and adults,
including that the justifications for sentencing adults harshly do not apply to
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1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
2. Graham v. Florida, 130 U.S. 2011, 2034 (2010).
3. Miller v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 2455, 2460, 2476 (2012).
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kids. However, despite these decisions moving juvenile sentencing
practices in the right direction, the Court continues to fail to recognize that
too many kids are still being subjected to an overly harsh and futile
punishment, LWOP. Even worse is that many of these minors were not the
main perpetrators of the offenses underlying their convictions. In Miller,
the Court opined that the "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon."5 Yet there are still about
2,570 individuals sentenced to die in prison in the United States for crimes
they committed as kids.6 Juvenile LWOP denotes a life sentence without
the possibility of parole imposed on someone for a crime they committed as
a minor (under eighteen years old).
An LWOP sentence signifies that these juveniles are irredeemable,
while many of them are anything but hopeless.8 In fact, while Graham
prohibits an LWOP sentence for anything but a homicide crime, various
estimates show that anywhere from 26% to close to 50% of juveniles
serving LWOP sentences in the United States did not kill anyone but rather
a co-participant of theirs did so without the knowledge or intent of the
teenager who is now facing the consequences.9 Further, in the great
majority of juvenile LWOP cases the youth had an adult codefendant-and
56% of the time these adults are getting lesser sentences than the kids.io
This disparate treatment of different offenders would make sense if the
sentences were imposed in the opposite direction. However, given that
juvenile offenders are less culpable as determined by the Supreme Court,
this sentencing trend is shocking and clearly illustrates changes are
necessary to make the juvenile justice system more just."
The practice of sentencing juveniles to LWOP is unduly harsh, applied
4. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (Human Rights Watch, Oct. 12,
2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "WHEN I DIE ... THEY'LL SEND ME HOME" YOUTH SENTENCED
TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN UPDATE 4 (Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2012);
Senate Bill 9: The Fair Sentencing for Youth Act, http://www.cdfca.org/includes/sb-9-fact-
sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 2013); Facts about Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/what-is-jlwop/ (last
visited Sept. 2013).
5. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
6. End Juvenile Life Without Parole, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (last visited Sept. 17,
2013), https://www.aclu.org/human-rights-racial-justice/end-juvenile-life-without-parole.
7. For purposes of this article, juvenile, minor, and kid are all used to refer to an individual
under eighteen years old.
8. Graham, 130 U.S. at 2029.
9. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 27; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 4, at 3; Senate Bill 9: The Fair Sentencing of Youth Act, supra note 4; Facts
about Life Without Parole for Children, supra note 4.
10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 4 n. 18.
11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
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in a racially discriminatory manner, extremely costly for the country, and
does not satisfy any legitimate punitive goals. This note will explore the
history of sentencing juveniles to LWOP as well as scientific studies that
support what the juvenile justice system was founded upon: kids' lessened
culpability and their greater amenability to rehabilitation. Sentencing
juveniles to die in prison is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
and every individual sentenced for a crime she or he committed as a
juvenile deserves an opportunity to be considered for parole. As an
alternative to a complete ban of LWOP for all juveniles, the high proportion
of LWOP juveniles convicted under the theory of felony murder should not
be sentenced to LWOP given their diminished culpability and that their
sentence violates Graham 's prohibition of LWOP for non-homicide crimes.
Finally, this note will advocate in favor of positive alternative sentences for
juveniles like the one recently adopted by California in 2013 and will
analyze the positive aspects of this new law, as well as areas where it could
be improved.
Part 1 of this note will look at the background of sentencing juveniles
to LWOP, the racial disparities in juvenile LWOP sentencing, the
exceptionality of the United States in utilizing this sentence, as well as
California's new law which essentially eliminates juvenile LWOP. Part 2
will apply several standards used by the court to determine whether a
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and will demonstrate that
sentencing juveniles to LWOP is unconstitutional. Part 3 will explore the
complexity of the felony murder doctrine and its adverse impact on
juveniles who generally cannot understand it and thus are not deterred by its
consequences. Further, this section will argue that juvenile LWOP-as
applied to individuals who have not committed murder nor intended to
kill-is not justified by any penological goals and violates Graham.
Finally, part 4 will explore the benefits of alternatives to juvenile LWOP,
specifically looking at California's new law and suggesting how this law
could be improved by including opportunities for earlier parole hearings
and earlier release dates.
I. Background
A. History of Juveniles Being Sentenced to Life Without Parole
Youth were seldom sentenced to LWOP until the 1980s, a period when
high crime rates and tough on crime politics led to harsher sentences and
more juveniles being transferred to adult criminal courts. In fact, from
1962 to 1981 about two juveniles were sentenced to LWOP each year.12
12. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 31.
Winter 2014] SENTENCED TO DIE IN PRISON 203
Then the number began to increase, peaking in 1996 when 152 kids were
sentenced to LWOP.13 Despite decreasing juvenile murder convictions, the
rate of those sentenced to LWOP has increased over the years. For
example, in 1990 there were 2,234 youth convicted of murder and 2.9
percent were sentenced to LWOP.14 Then, in 2000 there were only 1,006
youth convicted of murder but 9.1% were sentenced to LWOP, reflecting a
trend toward harsher and more punitive measures implemented by
legislators and law enforcement.' 5 While arguably the largest cost arguably
is the lost opportunity of juvenile offenders to have a second chance to right
their paths in life, it also will cost $4 billion to incarcerate the existing
2,570 individuals sentenced to LWOP as juveniles until their deaths.16
B. Trying Juveniles as Adults and the Rise of Direct Files
Since the beginning of the juvenile justice court system in the 1890s
there have been mechanisms for juvenile court judges to waive jurisdiction
and send minors to adult criminal courts. However, in more recent years
the use of these types of transfers has increased substantially. 7  For
example, between 1971 and 1981 the rate of juvenile transfers to adult
courts in relation to juvenile arrests increased from 1% to 5%.18 During the
1990s the legislatures of 47 states and the District of Columbia passed laws
making their juvenile justice systems more punitive by "ma[king] it easier
to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system to the [adult]
criminal justice system."' 9 At present, a juvenile can be transferred to the
adult criminal court system in one of three ways: through a judicial waiver,
an automatic statutory waiver, or a direct file by the prosecutor.2 0
A judicial waiver may be initiated by the juvenile court, the
prosecutor, or the juvenile. 2 1 The juvenile court judge then weighs various
13. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 31.
14. Id. at 2.
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 2.
16. Id.; Senate Bill 9: The Fair Sentencing of Youth Act, supra note 4; CAMPAIGN FOR THE
FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, supra note 4.
17. Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment
The Age at Which a Child Should be Held Responsible for His or Her Actions Has Been Debated
For Centuries, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 783, 794 (2000).
18. Id.
19. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (Nat'] Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Ctr. Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1999) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/htmllojjdp/
nationalreport99/frontmatter.pdf.
20. Beresford, supra note 17, at 793.
21. PATRICK GRIFFIN, SEAN ADDIE, BENJAMIN ADAMS & KATHY FIRESTINE, TRYING
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 2 (Nat'l Ctr.
for Juvenile Justice, Ctr. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2011) available
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factors to determine if a transfer would be appropriate.2 2 While most states
have always permitted judicial waiver of juveniles to adult court, the
practice was not used much until the 1960s. 23
Automatic statutory waivers primarily focus on the offense and serve
as the legislature's method of communicating to juveniles that commission
of particular crimes results in being tried as an adult without consideration
of any mitigating factors.24 Generally, the most serious offenses, such as
murder, rape, or kidnapping, are automatically waived.25 The Supreme
Court pointed out that merely because states authorize youth to be
transferred to adult courts does not mean that the state legislatures also
considered subjecting juveniles to the same harsh penalties as adults.26 The
Court opined in Thompson that transfer statutes show "the States consider
15-year-olds to be old enough to be tried in criminal court for serious
crimes (or too old to be dealt with effectively in juvenile court), but tells us
nothing about the judgment these States have made regarding the
appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders." 27 The Court's insight
here shows that even though the legislatures may have determined that
some juveniles are not amenable to the solutions a juvenile court provides,
that does not mean the juveniles require harsh adult punishments. Instead,
perhaps kids who commit "adult" crimes require a sentence distinct both
from average juvenile offenders as well as adult offenders and should be
treated individually based on their age and the seriousness of their crime.
The most controversial type of transfer of juveniles is the direct file,
which can happen when a state has concurrent jurisdiction statutes.2 8 Under
this type of transfer a prosecutor has the option of choosing whether to
pursue a matter against a minor in juvenile or criminal court. California
prosecutors have this discretion over sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who
commit certain serious crimes-like murder, arson or robbery-and over
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds who commit similar offenses that have
aggravating factors-such as those committed to benefit a gang. 29 Direct
files give a great amount of discretion to prosecutors, a biased player in the
adversary system. Last year in Colorado a law passed with bipartisan
support which would greatly limit the role of prosecutors in deciding where
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
22. GRIFFIN, supra note 21.
23. Beresford, supra note 17, at 806.
24. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get
Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 415-416 (1999).
25. Beresford, supra note 17, at 806.
26. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2025.
27. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion).
28. GRIFFIN, ADDIE, ADAMS, & FIRESTINE, supra note 21.
29. Cal. Welf & Inst. Code § 707(d)(1)-(2) (West 2013).
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juvenile cases should be tried. 30  This is a positive change because
prosecutors in Colorado had overused the direct-file system, and it was
harming teenagers by labeling them with felony convictions for mistakes
made at a young age.
C. The Disproportionate Impact of LWOP Sentences on Juveniles of
Color
Moving away from mandatory transfers and mandatory impositions of
LWOP has the potential to improve the juvenile justice system by giving
kids the chance to receive just sentences that will promote their reform.
The juvenile justice system will move in this direction so long as judges use
their discretion in good faith to find the best sentence for the juveniles
before them. However, whenever there is discretion in the way the judicial
system is managed there is the potential for racial biases and
misconceptions to have an adverse impact on individuals' cases and
sentences. This has been the case with LWOP sentences for juveniles.
African American youth are sentenced to juvenile LWOP "at a per capita
rate that is 10 times that of white youth convicted of the same crimes." 32 As
of 2009, pre-Graham, 84% of Florida juveniles facing juvenile LWOP for
non-homicide offenses were African American.33  In addition to the
ineffectiveness of juvenile LWOP at achieving any rehabilitative, punitive
or deterrence goals (as will be argued later in this paper), the high
likelihood of an adverse racial impact in its application is another important
factor to consider when evaluating juvenile LWOP and its many flaws.
While it's important for judges to have discretion in sentencing juveniles so
that more rehabilitative options can be incorporated into their sentences,
this same discretion also appears to result in the actualization of racial
biases where young juveniles of color are paying the price.
D. United States Stands Alone in Sentencing Juveniles to LWOP
While juvenile incarceration rates are at their lowest since 1975, the
United States still locks up more kids than other countries. 34 Juveniles are
30. Dan Frosch, Colorado Revisits Law That Gives Prosecutors Wide Power to Try Youths
as Adults, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/colorado-revisits-
its-juvenile-crime-law.html?r--0.
31. Tim Hoover, Hickenlooper Signs 'Direct File' Into Law That Limits Charging Juveniles
as Adults, THE DENVER POST (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/
breakingnews/ci_20444785/hickenlooper-signs-direct-file-into-law-that-limits#ixzz2NBHjUivO/.
32. CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, supra note 4.
33. Meghna Philip and Jacqueline Cremos, Juvenile Life Without Parole Is Unconstitutional
. . . Almost, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.L. (June 26, 2012), http://www.brennan
center.org/blog/juvenile-life-without-parole-unconstitutionalE2%80%A6almost.
34. Amanda Paulson, Why juvenile incarceration reached its lowest rate in 38 years, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/
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incarcerated in the United States at a rate eighteen times greater than that of
France, and more than seven times greater than that of Britain. 5  In
addition, according to Amnesty International the United States virtually
stands alone in its practice of sentencing juveniles to LWOP.36 In a 2005
report Amnesty found that "all countries except the United States and
Somalia have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
explicitly forbids 'life imprisonment without possibility of release" for
"offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age."37 So while
the recent Supreme Court cases are getting closer to international standards,
the United States still has a long way to go in achieving a more just juvenile
justice system as compared to how other countries treat their juvenile
offenders.
E. California's New Law: The Fair Sentencing for Youth Act
One of the most recent changes in sentencing juveniles to LWOP
occurred in California. The Fair Sentencing for Youth Act was signed into
law by Governor Brown in 2012 and went into effect in January 2013.
This law applies retroactively to the nearly 300 LWOP juveniles currently
in California prisons. 39 This law creates a procedure to review the progress
and steps made toward reform of individuals sentenced to LWOP for crimes
committed as youth, with a possibility of resentencing. 40 It supports the
notion that kids "- even those who have committed serious crimes-are
better than their worst acts and, therefore, deserve a second chance at
life."4 1
II. Juvenile LWOP Violates the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment "guarantees individuals the right not to be
subjected to excessive sanctions."4 2 An LWOP sentence for juveniles will
always be excessive because kids have a greater likelihood of reform and a
sentence of LWOP does not recognize this potential-keeping individuals
0227/Why-juvenile-incarceration-reached-its-lowest-rate-in-38-years/(page)/2.
35. Paulson, supra note 34.
36. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 5.
37. Id. at 5.




40. Jody Kent Lavy, California's Passage of Fair Sentencing Act Sets Stage for Rest of
Country, YOUTH TODAY (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.youthtoday.org/view-blog.
cfin?blogid=639.
41. Id.
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
Winter 2014] SENTENCED TO DIE IN PRISON 207
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
locked up past the point at which there exists a penological reason to do
SO.43 The Supreme Court has found that sentences "should be graduated
and proportioned to both the offender and the offense"44 (emphasis added).
So not only must courts consider the crime committed by a juvenile, but
they must also consider his or her youth when determining what type of
punishment is most appropriate. Recent Supreme Court decisions stressed
that even when kids commit the worst crimes, unique qualities inherent
with youth lessen the rationale of sentencing juveniles to the harshest
sentences.45 No strong rationale exists for sentencing juveniles to LWOP,
"the second most severe penalty permitted by law" and the harshest
punishment currently available for juveniles.4 6 As LWOP is applied to
juveniles it is an even harsher sentence than when applied to adults-
comparable to the death penalty-because a juvenile sentenced to die in
prison will likely spend more years behind bars than an older person
sentenced to LWOP.4 7 LWOP is also the only other sentence, besides the
death penalty, where the individual knows he or she will never have an
opportunity to reenter society and make amends for his or her misdeeds.
There are two models the Court uses to determine whether a sentence
is disproportionate to the offender and the crime committed; one is
individualized and the other takes a more categorical approach. 4 8 The first
model considers whether a specific sentence length is appropriate for the
particular defendant and the particular crime.4 9 This analysis applies when
considering the validity of an individual's sentence, its severity in light of
the defendant's distinct circumstances, and whether others who have been
similarly convicted have been punished by comparable means.50 Under the
second type of challenge to the constitutionality of a sentence, the Court has
considered whether a categorical ban of a particular sentence for a type of
offender or offense is appropriate.5 1  For instance, individuals who
committed their crimes as juveniles cannot get the death penalty, so an
entire category of offenders (juveniles here) is excluded from a particular
sentence because such punishment is disproportionate given the offenders'
special characteristics. 52  The Court has also prohibited sentencing
individuals who have committed non-homicide offenses to the death
43. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 6-7; Senate Bill 9: The Fair Sentencing for
Youth Act, supra note 4; THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, supra note 4.
44. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2458 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560).
45. Id.
46. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
47. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027.
48. Id. at 2021.
49. Id.
50. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005.
51. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022.
52. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
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penalty.53  This is an example of how a category of offenses (not just
offenders) can be singled out as a classification undeserving of the harshest
punishment. The latter analysis will apply for a challenge to the overall
constitutionality of LWOP for juveniles because it is a categorical
prohibition being proposed to remedy the Eighth Amendment violation; not
that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence as applied in one or two cases,
but that as it is applied to all juveniles it is disproportionate to their
culpability and should be banned.
At present, only juveniles who have been convicted of murder may be
sentenced to LWOP. 54 Thus, a challenge to the imposition of a juvenile
LWOP sentence is not so much a challenge to the sentence as it is applied
to a particular offense (murder), but as it is applied to a group of special
offenders (juveniles). Graham, in which LWOP was banned for juveniles
who had committed non-homicide crimes, was the first case where a
categorical challenge was granted for a sentence outside of the death
penalty. 5 In that case it was not appropriate to weigh the proportionality of
the number of years in the sentence (the offender's natural life) against the
crime committed to warrant LWOP because there was a whole range of
crimes to which the categorical ban would apply.56  Here, what is
questionable about juvenile LWOP is not that it is a disproportionate
sentence for the crime of murder, but that it is disproportionate as applied to
juveniles. Accordingly the categorical challenge analysis should be
applied.
A. Categorical Challenge to Juvenile LWOP Analysis
When a court is determining whether to adopt a categorical rule it will
start by investigating "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed
in legislative enactments and state practice" to determine if there is a
"national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue."57 Even if
consensus is found this does not completely answer the question of the
sentence's constitutionality.5 8  Next, a court must use the tools it has
available-the Eighth Amendment's text, precedent, and the court's
interpretive expertise-to determine whether the punishment in question
violates the Constitution.59
53. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022; see also Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977).
54. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2030, 2034.
55. Id. at 2022-023.
56. Id. at 2022.
57. Id.
58. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
59. Id. at 421.
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B. National Trend in Moving Away from Juvenile LWOP?
One way to evaluate the national consensus factor is by considering if
the challenged sentence is rare or if many jurisdictions have eliminated its
use.60 According to a 2004 report by The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing
of Youth (which was updated in 2008 and 2009 by about 14 states) only
four states appear to ban juvenile LWOP (Alaska, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Oregon).6 ' Several other states do not ban juvenile LWOP altogether,
but do not have any offenders serving LWOP sentences for crimes they
committed as kids.62 Another 2010 study from the National Conference of
State Legislatures found that 39 states and the federal government allow
juvenile LWOP.63 While these assessments do not take into consideration
more recent developments like California's new law (which eliminates
juvenile LWOP for many juvenile offenders), it appears that this sentence is
still being widely utilized.64  Across the country there are around 2,570
individuals serving life sentences for crimes they committed in their
youth. However, the majority of people serving juvenile LWOP sentences
have historically been geographically concentrated in five states: California,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.66 While California
no longer belongs to this group, based on their 2010 records the other four
states constitute almost half of the entire juvenile LWOP population in the
United States with about 1,182 inmates locked up for life for crimes they
committed as minors. 7 While it may appear that the sentence is not rare
and is commonly used in the majority of jurisdictions, 32 states and the
District of Columbia either do not have juvenile LWOP or have less than 25
people serving this sentence. 68  In fact, in 27 states and the District of
Columbia juvenile LWOP is either not a sentence option or there are fewer
than ten individuals serving this sentence. 6 9 Overall, nine states and the
District of Columbia either prohibit juvenile LWOP or have not utilized it
as a sentence.7 0  This shows that a minority of the states has adopted
juvenile LWOP as a regular sentencing practice and a majority of the others
60. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
61. How many people are serving in my state? THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING
OF YOUTH (Sept. 19, 2013), http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reports-and-research/how-many-
people-are-serving-in-my-state/.
62. Id.
63. Nat'1 Conference of State Legislatures, Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) 16-17
(February 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf.
64. Cal. Penal Code § I 170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013).
65. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 6.
66. THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, supra note 4.
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uses it quite sparingly if at all.
While a national consensus is not required, it is helpful for illustrating
there is no longer a need for the sentence and that the states are by and large
moving away from a particular sentencing practice.7' The Roper Court
found that a smaller number of states had "abandoned capital punishment
for juvenile offenders . . . than [had] abandoned capital punishment for the
mentally retarded . .. yet . .. the same consistency of direction of change
has been demonstrated."7 2 While a majority of the states have not abolished
juvenile LWOP, states that have seen change have been moving in that
direction over the last few years including California, Colorado, and other
jurisdictions that use juvenile LWOP sparingly. 7 3
C. Precedent and How the Court Would Rule on the Constitutionality
of Juvenile LWOP
The Court has found that while consensus in the community is
"entitled to great weight," it is not dispositive of whether a sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment. 74 Ultimately, whether it is widely practiced or not,
it is still up to the Court to make a final judgment as to the constitutionality
of a sentence.75 The Court must consider the offender, their culpability, and
the crime alongside the "severity of the punishment." 76 In addition the
Court considers if the sentence is promoting the four penological goals:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.77
While the Court explicitly allowed for this harshest punishment in
Roper and Graham, it did so under the assumption it would be used
sparingly and ideally only under circumstances when the sentencing judge
could make the difficult distinction between "the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity" from "the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."78 However, because
juveniles are still maturing and their brains have yet to fully develop, this
difference is impossible to discern at the time of sentencing.
It makes sense to give juvenile offenders a chance to rehabilitate and to
revisit a juvenile's case in the form of a parole hearing for several reasons.
First, juvenile LWOP sentences do not provide an opportunity to determine
at a later date, "after a period of incarceration, rehabilitation, and maturity,"
71. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
72. Id.
73. Cal. Penal Code § 170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat.Ann. § 17-22.5-
104(2)(d)(IV) (West 2013); Nat'1 Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 63.
74. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434.
75. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
76. Id. at 568.
77. Id. at 572.
78. Id. at 573.
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whether juvenile offenders still pose a threat to public safety.79 Imposition
of juvenile LWOP sentences ignores crime statistics which show that
violent crimes are most prevalent among eighteen to twenty-four year olds,
and that after age twenty-five this rate dramatically decreases.80 There is an
extremely low risk of re-offending after an individual reaches age thirty or
forty, which is about fifteen to twenty-five years into a juvenile LWOP
sentence. 8 ' For penological and financial reasons it does not make sense to
continue to incarcerate individuals who committed crimes in their youth for
longer durations than is necessary for public safety and to rehabilitate the
youth.
Secondly, as the Court emphasized in Graham, kids have a greater
capacity for reform.8 2 The Supreme Court continues to find that juveniles
are special because of inherent features that make them less culpable and
provide them with greater capacity for rehabilitation. 83 The Court identifies
three main gaps between adults and juveniles. First, kids tend to be less
mature than adults with "an underdeveloped sense of responsibility" with
the potential for "recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking." 84
Second, juveniles are generally "more vulnerable .. . to negative influences
and outside pressures," such as family and friends, and have less of an
ability to control their environment.85  It is also difficult for kids to get
themselves out of "crime-producing settings." 86  Also, juveniles are still
developing, so their behavior is not as likely to be "evidence of
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity]."87 Sentencing juveniles to LWOP ignores their
potential to change if given the right tools (i.e. the ability to mature and
learn from their mistakes outside the environment that may have in great
part led to their criminal acts).
Third, research demonstrates the brain continues to develop throughout
adolescence and into early adulthood. 8 9 Neuroimaging studies show kids
79. Deborah LaBelle, Anna Phillips, & Laural Horton, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 19 (ACLU of Michigan, 2004).
80. SECOND CHANCES, supra note 80.
81. Id.
82. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026.
83. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 570.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 569-70.
89. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026; Mental Health America, Position Statement 58: Life Without
Parole for Juvenile Offenders (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.mentalhealthamerica. net/go/position-
statements/58; Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Graham v. Florida, 130 U.S. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) at 16-24; Brief for
American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v.
Florida, 130 U.S. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) at 22-27.
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are "more likely to respond impulsively, utilizing a more primitive part of
their brain," and that they are "less likely to stop, think things through, and
analyze the consequences of their actions." 90 Interestingly, areas of the
brain regulating impulse control, risk assessment and moral reasoning are
the last ones to develop. 91 Before these portions of the brain develop,
juveniles rely on parts of the brain connected with aggressive and impulsive
behaviors. 92 Due to these factors, it is impossible to predict with certainty
which, if any, juvenile offenders need to be incarcerated forever to ensure
public safety. As such LWOP for juveniles will never be applied as the
Supreme Court intended (i.e., in the "rare" case which reflects "irreparable
corruption").93  Therefore, all juveniles should at the very least have the
opportunity to prove they are reformed and worthy of release. Thus,
juvenile LWOP should not exist as a sentencing scheme.
While the Supreme Court's recent cases explicitly allow for juvenile
LWOP sentences as long as the sentencer has discretion and the crime in
question is homicide, the Court also states that the differences between kids
and adults "counsel against" a juvenile LWOP sentence. 94  Also, the
situation anticipated for the use of juvenile LWOP will never exist. The
decision-maker, just like an expert psychologist, will not have all the
information she or he needs to determine whether a juvenile's crime reflects
"irreparable corruption" and warrants an LWOP sentence.95 A judge cannot
accurately predict whether a juvenile will reform himself or herself enough
to reenter society twenty or thirty years down the line.
D. Juvenile LWOP Does Not Satisfy Any Penological Justifications
The Supreme Court stated that a sentence which lacks "any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense."96
The four legitimate justifications for punishment are retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 97 Here the Court should find that none of
the penological goals are met by sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
The theory of retribution aims to match "the harshness of the
punishment to seriousness of the offense."9 8 This is done by looking not
90. Mental Health America, supra note 89.
91. Mary Helen Roberts, Paul Benz & Sharon Park, Give Juvenile Offenders a Chance at
Redemption, HERALDNET (Feb. 23, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/2013
0223/OPINION03/702249930?page=1.
92. Give Juvenile Offenders a Chance, supra note 91.
93. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
94. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
95. Id.
96. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028.
97. Id.
98. Mental Health America, supra note 89.
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only at the crime committed, but also at the defendant's mental state. 99
Kids generally do not have "the same intentions as adults even when they
are performing the same acts and causing the same very bad consequences,
including death." 00 Therefore, the Court has found "the case for retribution
is not as strong with a minor as with an adult." 0' Retribution is punishment
in its purest form: punishment for the sake of revenge for the wrong done
by the offender. An eye for an eye. Making sure the offender suffers for
what he or she has done. Because the juvenile offender is not as culpable
for his or her actions as a similarly situated adult, there is less of an
incentive to punish that juvenile simply for the sake of penalizing them for
a criminal act.
Punishments also generally aim to deter and serve as a warning to
those thinking of comnitting crimes. In Roper, the Court stated that, "the
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest
... that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." 02 Just as kids
may not understand the consequences of their actions which result in harm
to others, they are not thinking ahead about what will happen to them if
they are found guilty of a crime. Deterrence, as a principle, "is based on the
assumption of a rational actor who considers consequences before acting
and is in control of his actions, an assumption that is not appropriate for
children and adolescents."' 03 Deterring juveniles is highly unlikely because
"they tend to live in the present, think of themselves as invincible, and have
difficulty contemplating the long-term consequences of their behavior," so
this goal is not a convincing one to justify sentencing juveniles to LWOP.104
Another goal of criminal sanctions is incapacitation. An LWOP
sentence assumes an individual needs to be incarcerated forever to promote
public safety.'05 This type of assumption "requires the sentencer to make a
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible."' 0 Yet the Court has stressed
that "incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth." 0 7  Juvenile LWOP
"improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth
and maturity."' 08 Also, incapacitation does not serve a legitimate purpose
after a "defendant has been rehabilitated and no longer poses a threat to
society."' 09
99. Mental Health America, supra note 89.
100. Id.
101. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028.
102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
103. LaBelle, Phillips, & Horton, supra note 79, at 17.
104. Mental Health America, supra note 89.
105. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2029.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968)).
108. Id.
109. Mental Health America, supra note 89.
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Finally, an idealistic goal of imprisonment is rehabilitation. LWOP
rejects the potential for rehabilitation or an opportunity to reenter one's
community."o By denying juveniles the possibility of parole, states,
legislators, and judges make "an irrevocable judgment about that person's
value and place in society.""' In addition, individuals serving LWOP
sentences "are often denied access to vocational training and other
rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates."1 2 The lack of
"rehabilitative opportunities or treatment" for juvenile offenders, "who are
most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation," clearly demonstrates the
absurdity of juvenile LWOP."'
Taken together, the goals of punishment are not furthered by
sentencing juveniles to LWOP and the arguments against imposing the
sentence on juveniles, namely juveniles' lesser culpability and greater
ability to reform, outweigh any potential, positive retributive, deterrent, or
incapacitative effects.
III. Juvenile LWOP Violates the Eigth Amendment Even if
the Court Does Not Recognize it as Unconstitutional
While LWOP sentences for juveniles are meant to be reserved for the
worst of the worst, being that it is the most severe sentence a juvenile can
receive, estimates for the number of kids serving LWOP who did not
actually kill anyone range anywhere from 26% to as high as almost 50%.1 14
This group of kids was charged and convicted of murder under the felony
murder doctrine, a theory that "traditionally attributes death caused in the
course of a felony to all participants who intended to commit the felony,
regardless of whether they killed or intended to kill."' '5 Under Graham's
ruling, in cases where the juvenile neither kills nor intends to kill he or she
has a "twice diminished moral culpability."" 6  Juveniles sentenced to
LWOP where no intent to kill has been established are facing
unconstitutional penalties, must be resentenced. At the very least this
sentence must be prohibited unless the State can prove the juvenile intended
to kill.
Another telling part of this story is who the accomplices of juveniles
are. In California, juvenile offenders who were initially sentenced to




114. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Supra note 6.
115. 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 14.5(a) and (c) (Thompson West,
2d ed. 2003).
116. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027.
Winter 2014] SENTENCED TO DIE IN PRISON 215
LWOP had an adult co-defendant "over 70% of the time.""' Further, 56%
of the time, the adult co-defendants received less harsh sentences than the
kids." 8 This discrepancy is puzzling given juveniles' unique characteristics
that distinguish them from adults and make them less culpable." 9 Harsher
punishments for juveniles than adults may reflect a fear of so-called
juvenile super predators, "youth with no moral conscience who see crime as
a rite of passage, who are unconcerned about the consequences of their
actions, and who are undeterred by the sanctions that could be leveled
against them by the juvenile justice system." 20  This over-simplified
explanation for an increase in crime among youth "gave policymakers an
easy answer to a complex social problem and an answer that permitted them
to ignore (or discredit) many of the more complex social causes proposed
for the increase in violent juvenile crime."1 2 1 A fear of LWOP juveniles is
especially unjustified because 59% of the time when a youth is sentenced to
LWOP it is for their first crime, illustrating they are not hardened
recidivists. 22
LWOP for juveniles who were not the trigger people in their offenses
is problematic because "defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or
foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of such
punishments than are murderers." 23  One of the defendants in Miller,
Kuntrell Jackson, was this type of juvenile offender.' 24  Jackson was
fourteen years old at the time of the crime resulting in his LWOP
sentence.12 5 Jackson and two other boys robbed a video store, and on the
way to the store Jackson learned one of his coconspirators had a gun.12 6 At
the video store Jackson was outside for most of the transaction, but when he
entered one of the other boys shot and killed the video store clerk.127
Jackson was convicted of capital murder and an LWOP sentence was
mandated.12 8  While his mandatory sentence is no longer constitutional
117. Matthew Fleischer, Kids Locked Up for Life Without Parole See One Glimmer of Hope,
TAKE PART (August 14, 2012), http://www.takepart.com/article/2012/08/14/teenage-lifers.
118. Id.
119. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality opinion); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §
707(d)(1)-(2) (West 2013); Frosch, supra note 30.
120. Juvenile Violent Offenders - The Concept Of The Juvenile Super Predator, LAW
LIBRARY - AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION (last visited Oct. 23, 2013),
http://law.jrank.org/pages/1546/Juvenile-Violent-Offenders-concept-juvenile-super-predator.htmi.
121. Id.
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4; Senate Bill 9: The Fair Sentencing of Youth Act,
supra note 4.
123. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2016.
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under Miller, the Court did not decide the issue as to whether his potential
lack of intent regarding the killing would rule out an LWOP sentence for
him and others in similar situations.12 9
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor wrote a concurrence in Miller on this
very issue, arguing that Jackson deserved another hearing to determine
whether there was a sufficient finding of his intent to kill.130 The Justices
determined that "without such a finding, the Eighth Amendment as
interpreted in Graham forbids sentencing Jackson to [LWOP].," 3 ' For all
the reasons kids are different from adults as well as their lesser culpability
and lack of intent in many felony murder cases, sentencing juveniles to
LWOP, for whom an intent to kill has not been proved, violates Graham
and the Eighth Amendment.132
In addition to the unconstitutionality of sentencing juveniles to LWOP
who neither killed nor intended to kill, there is also an issue with the theory
of the felony murder doctrine as it is applied to kids generally and for
sentencing purposes. Typically, the felony murder doctrine is "premised on
the idea that one engaged in a dangerous felony should understand the risk
that the victim of the felony could be killed, even by a confederate."' 33
However, it is this ability to consider the full consequences of one's actions
and the ability to adjust one's conduct accordingly that juveniles lack the
capacity to do effectively.' 34 It does not make sense that lawmakers would
try to deter juveniles from participating in inherently dangerous felonies
where a murder might occur by scaring them with the possibility of an
LWOP sentence. Bryan Stevenson, the defense attorney in Jackson's case,
shared, "most of my [juvenile] clients had never heard of life imprisonment
without parole and had no capacity to appreciate what it would mean. It
takes them years before they even get what it means to be sentenced to life
in prison without parole, because they're just not used to thinking that far
ahead."' 3 5  Unlike adults whom we expect to anticipate the inherent
dangerousness of their activities, juveniles are unlikely to anticipate
secondary consequences of their actions (i.e., that a burglary of a
convenience store might result in a passerby's death).
In addition, transferred intent as it is applied under the felony murder




133. Id. at 2476; LAFAVE, supra note 115, at § 14.5(c).
134. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2476.
135. Nina Totenberg, Do Juvenile Killers Deserve Life Behind Bars?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
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doctrine has generally not been enough for Eighth Amendment purposes.1 36
For example, it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty "upon an
aider and abettor in a robbery, where that individual did not intend to
kill." 3 ' The Court should make a similar finding for the highest penalty
available to juveniles. If a juvenile did not intend to kill and was not the
trigger person, a court cannot transfer another's intent for purposes of
sentencing the juvenile to LWOP. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits juvenile LWOP if the offender was convicted under the felony
murder doctrine, unless there is a clear showing made that the youth
intended to kill.
IV. State and Federal Legislatures Should Abolish Juvenile
LWOP and Allow Juveniles to Petition for Early Release
Under a Model Similar to that Recently Adopted in
California
There is no reason to sentence juveniles to LWOP when there are
alternatives that promote the same amount of public safety and, unlike
LWOP, create incentives for rehabilitation. Alternatives like life with the
possibility of parole do not guarantee that a youth will be released. On the
contrary, this type of sentence forecloses early release unless the individual
can show she or he has reformed. However, life with the possibility of
parole does give juveniles who show remorse and have changed the
opportunity to reenter their communities and rejoin society as contributing
members. With other sentencing options available, like life with the
possibility of parole, which ensures public safety with a life sentence if it is
necessary in particular cases but also treats each juvenile offender as an
individual, juvenile LWOP is an overly excessive and superfluous
punishment. That is not to say all juvenile LWOP sentences should simply
be replaced with life with parole, but because alternative harsh punishments
still exist for the rare juvenile who is found irredeemable over the course of
their sentence, opponents to juvenile justice reform should not be worried
about becoming too soft on crime.
The American Constitution Society calls for a sentencing alternative to
juvenile LWOP called "periodic review."13 8  This consists of multiple
evaluations of the youth and the sentence to decide whether the young
person remains a public safety concern.' 39 With this type of sentence kids
136. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2476.
137. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982)).
138. Jody Kent & Beth Colgan, A JUST ALTERNATIVE TO SENTENCING YOUTH TO LIFE IN
PRISON WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE 8 (Am. Constitution Soc'y for Law and Policy,
2010).
139. Id.
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spend at least 10 or more years incarcerated and are only resentenced for
release if they show remorse and rehabilitation.14 0  This organization
confirms that public safety will not be adversely affected by an elimination
of juvenile LWOP. On the contrary, with the potential to spend less money
on incarceration and more money on youth programs and rehabilitative
services, crimes could be prevented in the first place.141 Further,
individuals are only released if they can demonstrate to a parole board that
they are ready to reenter their communities.14 2
California's Fair Sentencing for Youth Act is very similar to the
"periodic review" sentence and provides serious juvenile offenders, who
have been sentenced to life terms, the opportunity to be released if they can
demonstrate remorse and rehabilitation. The law provides that when an
LWOP juvenile has served "at least 15 years of that sentence" he or she can
petition the sentencing court for a recall and resentencing.143 An individual
who is determined amenable to reenter society may not be released before
his or her 25th year of incarceration.14 4 Juveniles who tortured their victims
or whose victims were public safety officials of any kind are exempted from
the opportunity to apply for early release under this law. 145 The defendant
must submit a statement describing his or her remorse and also must prove
one of several factors demonstrating the defendant does not pose a serious
public safety concern, is not a recidivist, was influenced by an adult actor,
or is working to rehabilitate him- or herself.146
This law provides a great opportunity for some of the 300 juvenile
offenders sentenced to LWOP in California as it applies retroactively and
allows for a chance at a life on the outside and an opportunity to give back
to the communities these individuals came from. Though, the law does
have quite a few limitations. For instance, if an individual's victim was a
police officer she or he has no chance of applying for early release. Also,
LWOP juveniles can only petition for early release between their 15th year
of incarceration and their 25th year of incarceration.14 7  If a juvenile
displayed extraordinary remorse and signs of change after 5 years, she or he
would still have to wait 10 more years to petition for an earlier release. The
release cannot come before the inmate's 25th year of incarceration.148 On
the other hand, if an individual did not display signs of rehabilitation until
140. Kent, supra note 138, at 9.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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after his or her 25th year, there would be no further opportunities to petition
for an early release.
Perhaps the legislature has determined that an unlimited window to
apply for resentencing would be too dangerous because it might potentially
result in the release of someone who would prove a danger to society.
However, this reasoning does not hold up because there is no provision for
an automatic release. Every petition will surely be reviewed with care and
only those who have shown true signs of rehabilitation and remorse will be
released. As such this limitation seems like an over-inclusive drafting of
the law. The law aims to ensure dangerous individuals remain
incapacitated. That said, as the law is now written, even rehabilitated
persons will remain incarcerated despite one of the main tenants of
American criminal law, which is that it is best to err on the side of letting a
guilty person go than to keep an innocent (or in this case reformed)
individual locked up.149
A. Other States Without Juvenile LWOP: Alternative Sentences and
Their Effectiveness
In addition to California's recent change, there are some other states
where juvenile LWOP sentences are prohibited under all circumstances. In
these jurisdictions juvenile offenders are held accountable using different
sentencing strategies similar to the new system in California.
In Oregon juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to LWOP. 50
Oregon law "mandates that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to
LWOP and that the trial judge should approach the sentencing of juveniles
with flexibility and not be constrained by mandatory sentencing
schemes." 5 1  Juvenile LWOP is also prohibited in New Mexico. The
maximum sentence permitted for juvenile offenders is life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole after serving at least 30 years. As of 2006,
Colorado no longer implements juvenile LWOP sentences, but their
approach is nowhere near as progressive as that of California, Oregon, or
New Mexico.152 In Colorado a juvenile offender may be eligible for parole
after serving at least 40 years of their sentence.15 3  However, this
opportunity to apply for parole does not apply to juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP before 2006.154 As a result 48 individuals serving
juvenile LWOP sentences will not be considered for parole or get the
149. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *358.
150. State-By-State Legal Resource Guide, UNIV. OF SAN FRANCISCO SCH. OF LAW (last
visited Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.usfca.edu/law/jlwop/resource-guide/.
151. Or. Rev. Stat. §161.620.
152. UNIV. OF SAN FRANCISCO SCH. OF LAW, supra note 150.
153. Colo. Rev. Stat. §17-22.5-104(IV)
154. Id.
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justice they deserve and the effects of this law will not be seen for about 30
years. 155
These alternatives to juvenile LWOP should be implemented by state
legislatures across the country to ensure that kids' sentences actually reflect
their culpability, while at the same time kids are being held responsible and
the public is kept safe. As California State Senator Leland Yee expressed
leading up to the change in California's law, giving kids a chance at parole
is not "a get-out-of-jail free card."l 56 Instead, it is an important reform to
the way youth are sentenced "that respects victims, international law, and
the fact that children have a greater capacity for rehabilitation than
adults."' 57
Conclusion
Kids are different from adults. So different that there is no
legitimate penological reason to continue imposing LWOP sentences on
juveniles. At the very least, the large proportion of LWOP juveniles who
did not kill or intend to kill anyone should have an opportunity to prove
their suitability for release. The Supreme Court should eliminate LWOP as
a sentence for juveniles because many youth are being sentenced to LWOP
in violation of Graham, and there is no way to definitively determine at the
time of sentencing whether a kid is irredeemable. Finally, if the Court will
not ban this sentence, state legislatures should adopt laws similar to
California's Fair Sentencing Act and start to form an even stronger national
consensus against juvenile LWOP. This will provide the Court the support
it needs to find that because society's social mores have changed,
sentencing juveniles to LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment and is thus
unconstitutional. 5 8
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